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Abstract
Background: Ebola is one of the most virulent human viral diseases, with a case fatality ratio between 25% to 90%.
The 2014 West African outbreaks are the largest and worst in history. There is no specific treatment or effective/safe
vaccine against the disease. Hence, control efforts are restricted to basic public health preventive
(non-pharmaceutical) measures. Such efforts are undermined by traditional/cultural belief systems and customs,
characterized by general mistrust and skepticism against government efforts to combat the disease. This study
assesses the roles of traditional customs and public healthcare systems on the disease spread.
Methods: A mathematical model is designed and used to assess population-level impact of basic
non-pharmaceutical control measures on the 2014 Ebola outbreaks. The model incorporates the effects of traditional
belief systems and customs, along with disease transmission within health-care settings and by Ebola-deceased
individuals. A sensitivity analysis is performed to determine model parameters that most affect disease transmission.
The model is parameterized using data from Guinea, one of the three Ebola-stricken countries. Numerical simulations
are performed and the parameters that drive disease transmission, with or without basic public health control
measures, determined. Three effectiveness levels of such basic measures are considered.
Results: The distribution of the basic reproduction number (R0) for Guinea (in the absence of basic control
measures) is such thatR0 ∈ [ 0.77, 1.35], for the case when the belief systems do not result in more unreported Ebola
cases. When such systems inhibit control efforts, the distribution increases toR0 ∈ [ 1.15, 2.05]. The total Ebola cases
are contributed by Ebola-deceased individuals (22%), symptomatic individuals in the early (33%) and latter (45%)
infection stages. A significant reduction of new Ebola cases can be achieved by increasing health-care workers’ daily
shifts from 8 to 24 hours, limiting hospital visitation to 1 hour and educating the populace to abandon detrimental
traditional/cultural belief systems.
Conclusions: The 2014 outbreaks are controllable using a moderately-effective basic public health intervention
strategy alone. A much higher (> 50%) disease burden would have been recorded in the absence of such intervention.
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Background
Ebola virus disease (EVD), caused by Ebola virus (EBOV)
and formerly known as Ebola hemorrhagic fever, is one
of the world’s most virulent diseases. The disease, which
spreads in human and other mammalian populations, has
a case fatality ratio from 25% to 90% in humans [1,2].
The first known case of EVD dates back to 1976, where
two outbreaks occurred (in Sudan and in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire; the later outbreak was
identified near the Ebola River, where the disease got its
name [2,3]). Since then, other outbreaks have occurred,
most notably in parts of Central Africa [3]. However, the
largest, andmost devastating, outbreak of EVD is the 2014
epidemic in threeWest African countries (Guinea, Liberia
and Sierra Leone). This EVD outbreak (believed to have
started in Guinea in March 2014 [2]) is the first to have
occurred in West Africa [4].
The disease, which also spread to Nigeria (started by an
airline passenger, who arrived from Liberia) and Senegal
(started by a student from Guinea, who arrived by land
transportation) [2,4], spread to other regions outside
Africa. For instance, some Ebola-infected patients were
flown to the US, France, Germany, Norway, Spain and the
UK [5] for health-care delivery. The US diagnosed its first
imported travel-related Ebola case in September 2014 (by
a person who had travelled to Dallas, Texas, from Liberia).
The imported case, who later died of the disease on 8
October 2014, resulted in the infection of two health-care
workers who cared for the deceased patient [6]. One of
the cases flown to Spain also led to an infection of health-
care workers [5]. Additionally, a separate Ebola outbreak,
unrelated to the West African outbreaks, occurred in the
Democratic Republic of Congo [2]. By 15 October 2014,
the case count for the 2014 EVD was 8,997 with 4,493
fatalities [6] (a case fatality ratio of about 50%). It should
be mentioned that these estimates include the cases for
Nigeria, Senegal, Spain and the USA [7]. These num-
bers increased to 15,935 and 5,689, respectively (36% case
fatality ratio) by 23 November 2014. The latest update,
dated 21 January 2015, shows a case count of 21,724
and 8,641 fatalities (representing a case fatality ratio of
40%) [7].
The natural reservoir and host of the EBOV is consid-
ered (albeit not yet proven [4]) to be fruit bats of the
Pteropodidae family [2]. It is hypothesized that the virus
is introduced into the human population when a human
comes into contact with the blood, organ secretions or
bodily fluids of an animal infected with the EBOV. The
incubation period of EBOV is between 2 and 21 days
[2,8,9] (although some studies have estimated the most
common incubation period to be 8 to 10 days [10]). Dur-
ing the incubation period, the virus infects body cells,
replicates and bursts out of the infected cells, produc-
ing EBOV glycoproteins that attach to the inside of blood
vessels, rendering the blood vessels to be more perme-
able. The increased permeability causes the blood vessels
to leak out blood [8]. The virus also evades the host’s nat-
ural defense system, by infecting immune cells, a channel
through which it is transported to other body parts and
organs, such as the liver, spleen, kidney and brain [8]. The
virus can cause these organs to fail, leading to death of the
infected human host.
Ebola-infected humans typically exhibit flu-like symp-
toms during the initial phase of the infection [8], and can
have, or progress to, other symptoms such as fever, severe
headache, muscle aches, weakness, vomiting, diarrhea,
stomach pains, loss of appetite and, at times, bleeding
(which may be visible or internal) [8,10,11]. An infected
human is infectious (i.e., capable of transmitting the dis-
ease to susceptible individuals) at the onset of symptoms
[2,8]. Transmission typically occurs when a susceptible
human comes into contact with virus-infected fluids, such
as blood, bodily secretions (e.g., feces, saliva, vomit, urine,
semen and sweat), organs or bodily fluids of an infected
human (dead or alive) [2,10]. Contact with such fluids
may be as a result of direct contact between suscepti-
ble and infected humans, or due to indirect contact with
environments contaminated with the aforementioned flu-
ids [2]. Individuals with high risk of exposure to EBOV
are the immediate family members of Ebola-infected
humans and health-care workers who treat Ebola-infected
patients.
In the absence of a cure (a specific treatment) or effec-
tive and safe vaccine against the spread of EBOV in
humans, anti-Ebola control efforts are mostly restricted
to basic public health preventive measures, disease
management and treatment of Ebola-related symptoms.
Public health preventive measures include approved
health-care techniques practiced by health-care workers
when dealing with Ebola-infected patients, or, in areas
around Ebola-infected patients, educating the public and
raising awareness of the disease, quarantine of suspected
cases, isolation of symptomatic cases, rapid laboratory
diagnostic tests, minimizing contact with bodily fluids,
wearing protective equipment by health-care providers
and proper handling of individuals who died of the Ebola
virus [2,10]. The disease management component of the
control strategy (for infected patients) typically entails the
administration of intravenous fluids and balancing elec-
trolytes to hydrate the patient, the maintenance of oxygen
levels and blood pressure, and possibly a transfusion with
blood from a matching Ebola survivor [4].
Recovery from the disease is possible (but the rate of
recovery tends to be lower than that of the Ebola-induced
death rate [11]). Note that some experimental drugs (such
as ZMapp [12] and TKM Ebola [13]) and vaccines are
being developed for use in humans (in fact, ZMapp was
reportedly used to treat the two American volunteers
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who contracted the disease while in missionary service in
Liberia, although its safety and efficacy have not yet been
tested on humans [14]). However, a person’s best chances
of survival, following the acquisition of the infection, is
early diagnosis (and prompt and effective disease man-
agement). This is challenging, however, since the early
symptoms of Ebola are similar to those of some other dis-
eases, such as malaria and typhoid fever (diseases that are
endemic in the region ravaged by the 2014 EBOV out-
breaks [10]). However, using approved laboratory tests, a
definitive diagnosis of EBOV can be made [2]. It is known
that Ebola infection confers permanent natural immu-
nity (in individuals who have recovered from the disease)
against re-infection [15]. Although a human may be clini-
cally cleared of the virus (i.e., is declared to be recovered),
a male may, however, still have the virus in his semen for 2
to 3 months [2,15], and it may be found in the breast milk
of breast-feeding mothers [15].
A number of mathematical models and statistical meth-
ods have been used in an attempt to understand the
transmission dynamics of EVD (see for instance [9,16-20],
and some of the references therein). In [9], a compart-
mental mathematical model was used to estimate the
number of secondary cases generated by an index case
(the basic reproduction number), in the absence or pres-
ence of control measures, for the 1995 Congo and 2000
Uganda Ebola outbreaks. The study further highlighted
the importance of basic public health control measures,
such as public health education, contact tracing and quar-
antine of suspected cases, and the role such measures
can play in reducing the final size of the epidemics. Most
recently, the basic reproduction number for the 2014
Ebola outbreak was estimated in [16,17,19-21]. Althaus
[16] estimated R0 for EBOV using incidence data and
a susceptible-exposed-infectious-recovered (SEIR) type
model. The study emphasized the heightening of control
measures in the three countries (especially in Liberia).
It should, however, be mentioned that the aforemen-
tioned studies did not incorporate the role that disease
transmission setting (community or health-care facil-
ities) plays in driving or curbing the spread of the
disease.
As evidenced by the current EBOV outbreaks in West
Africa, the epidemiological setting, in which interaction
and transmission between infected and susceptible indi-
viduals occur, plays an important role in the spread of
the disease [2,10]. For example, health-care workers (doc-
tors, nurses and other paramedic workers who are at the
front lines of disease management and control) mostly
acquire EVD infection in the hospital setting (or, in gen-
eral, health-care facilities), while caring for Ebola-infected
patients [2,10,11]. They have a high risk of Ebola-induced
mortality with 2,400 reported deaths among this group
during this 2014 outbreak [22]. Furthermore, the models
in [9,16,17,19,20] did not account for disease spread by
Ebola-infected deceased individuals (prior to, or during,
their burial or cremation), a feature that is known to play
a major role in the current outbreaks [2]. Legrand et al.
[18] developed a compartmental model, using data from
the 1995 Democratic Republic of Congo and 2000 Uganda
Ebola epidemic outbreaks. The model allowed for EBOV
transmission by infected humans in both the community
and the hospital.
Another important feature that plays a critical role in the
2014 EVD outbreaks is traditional/cultural belief systems
and customs. For instance, while some individuals in the
three Ebola-stricken nations believe that there is no Ebola
[23-25], others claim that it is government propaganda to
attract more foreign aid dollars [26], control the popu-
lation or harvest human organs [27]. Furthermore, some
susceptible members of the public (including those at high
risk of EBOV infection) refuse to be quarantined because
of their belief, or fear, that they might be deliberately
infected during quarantine [27,28]. There is also a fear that
they will not be able to give a loved one who died of Ebola
a proper traditional burial (since Ebola-infected humans
who die in hospitals are typically cremated [26,27,29],
a practice that is not accepted by those who harbor a
belief in traditional burial rituals). Adherence to these
traditional/cultural beliefs and customs often leads some
family members to hide Ebola-infected loved ones (to
evade the health-care system), resulting in the develop-
ment of shadow zones [28], where paramedics cannot
visit, and, invariably, resulting in significant underreport-
ing of EVD cases [21,30] (the Centers for Disease Control
estimated a potential underreporting correction factor of
2.5 [21]).
The aforementioned modeling studies did not incorpo-
rate the effect of traditional belief systems and customs
on the transmission dynamics of EVD in the communi-
ties (hence, they may have under estimated EVD burden).
The purpose of the current study is to assess the role
of such belief systems and customs, and health-care set-
tings, on the transmission dynamics of EVD in a pop-
ulation. To achieve this objective, a new deterministic
compartmental model, which incorporates the above and
other pertinent epidemiological, demographic and bio-
logical aspects of EVD, is formulated. The specific goals
are to determine the key factors that drive the disease
transmission process and to propose effective and afford-
able strategies to curtail the spread of the disease. The
paper is organized as follows. The model is formulated
in the section ‘Formulation of compartmental model’,
and the worst-case scenario component of the model (in
the absence of intervention) is investigated in section
‘Pre-intervention model’. The full model is studied in
section ‘Assessment of basic control measures’, where the
population-level impact of various effectiveness levels of
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a basic anti-Ebola public health control strategy are also
assessed. Discussion and recommendations stemming
from the study (as well as general ones) are given in the
Conclusions.
Methods
Formulation of compartmental model
This study is based on using a mathematical model,
parameterized using data for the 2014 EBOV outbreaks
in Guinea, to gain insight into the transmission dynam-
ics of the disease within that nation. Since the 2014 Ebola
outbreaks have been ongoing for nearly a year, the model
to be designed in this study incorporates demographic
effects (and the relevant parameters, C and μH , as
described in Table 1, are estimated using census data from
Guinea [31]). The model is formulated by splitting the
total population (of Guinea) into two main sub-groups,
namely a sub-group of individuals in the community and
another for those in health-care settings.
The population of individuals in the community con-
sists of individuals visiting loved ones (who are infected
with Ebola) in health-care facilities (notably hospitals) and
the rest of the general public. This population is further
sub-divided into sub-populations of susceptible/visiting-
susceptible (SC(t)/SV (t)), exposed/visiting-exposed (EC(t)
/EV (t)), symptomatic/visiting-symptomatic individuals
in the early stage of EVD infection (ICE(t)/IVCE(t)),
Table 1 Description of the state variables of themodel
in Figure 1
Variable Description
SC(t)/SV (t) Population of susceptible/visiting-susceptible
individuals in the community
EC(t)/EV (t) Population of exposed/visiting-exposed individuals in
the community
ICE(t)/ICEV (t) Population of symptomatic/visiting-symptomatic
individuals in the early stage of EBOV infection in the
community
ICN(t) Population of non-hospitalized symptomatic individuals
ICH(t) Population of hospitalized symptomatic individuals
RC(t), RCH(t),
RH(t), RRH(t)
Population of recovered individuals in the community/
health-care workers in the community and hospital
SH(t), SRH(t) Population of susceptible/returning-susceptible
health-care workers
EH(t), ERH(t) Population of exposed/returning-exposed health-care
workers
IH(t), IRH(t) Population of symptomatic/returning-symptomatic
health-care workers
DC(t),DH(t) Population of Ebola-deceased individuals in the
community and hospital
CD(t) Population of cremated/buried Ebola-deceased
individuals
non-hospitalized symptomatic (ICN (t)), hospitalized
symptomatic (ICH(t)) and recovered individuals (RC(t),
RCH(t)). The population of individuals in health-care
facilities consists of health-care workers in these facil-
ities (as well as those who return to the community
at the end of their shift at the hospital). In other
words, the population of individuals in the health-
care facilities is sub-divided into susceptible/returning-
susceptible health-care workers (SH(t), SRH(t)), exposed/
returning-exposed health-care workers (EH(t), ERH(t)),
symptomatic/returning-symptomatic health-care work-
ers (IH(t), IRH(t)) and recovered/returning-recovered
health-care workers (RH(t), RRH(t)). The model also
tracks the dynamics of the Ebola-infected deceased
individuals in the community and hospitals (DC(t),
DH(t)) and the cremated/buried Ebola-deceased individ-
uals (CD(t)). The equations of themathematical model are
given (and described) in the appendix. A flow diagram of
the model is depicted in Figure 1, and the associated state
variables and parameters are described in Tables 1 and 2.
Model (4), given in the appendix, extends the Ebola
transmission models in [9,16] by (inter alia):
• The dynamics of health-care workers are included
(i.e., the role of the associated health-care setting).
• The interaction between healthy (susceptible)
individuals in a community and infected individuals
in a hospital, through visits, are accounted for.
• The effect of traditional (cultural) belief systems and
customs that aid EVD transmission (such as the
handling of corpses during traditional burial
practices, etc.) are accounted for. This also entails the
mistrust of members of the community for authority,
and fear and stereotypes against seeking medical care
(for fear of being quarantined, and/or acquiring
infection during quarantine).
Furthermore, model (4) extends that in [18] by incorpo-
rating epidemiological compartments for, and dynamics
of, health-care workers and members of the general pub-
lic who visit family members and/or acquaintances in
hospitals, in addition to also including the role of tradi-
tional belief systems and customs on EBOV transmission
dynamics. Althoughmodel (4) is parameterized using data
from Guinea [16], the parametrization is assumed to be
robust enough and applicable to the other two Ebola-
stricken nations (Liberia and Sierra Leone).
Pre-intervention model
Model (4) is, first of all, studied for the special case
where no public health interventions (i.e., no basic anti-
Ebola control measures and/or diseasemanagement in the
health-care settings) are implemented in the community.
In the absence of such interventions, model (4) reduces to
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Figure 1 Flow diagram of the model.
the following basic (worst-case scenario) model (where a
dot represents differentiation with respect to time):
S˙C(t) = C − λC(ICE , ICN ,DC)SC(t) − μHSC(t),
E˙C(t) = λC (ICE , ICN ,DC) SC(t) − (σC + μH)EC(t),
I˙CE(t) = σCEC(t) − (αC + μH)ICE(t),
I˙CN (t) = αCICE(t) − (γC + μH)ICN (t), (1)
R˙C(t) = hγCICN (t) − μHRC(t),
D˙C(t) = (1 − h)γCICN (t) − δCDC(t),
C˙D(t) = δCDC(t),
where
λC (ICE , ICN ,DC) = βCφC (ICE + ICN + τCDC)SC + EC + ICE + ICN + RC + DC ,
is the infection rate of the disease (in the community),
and all other parameters in λC are as defined in Tables 1
and 2. In particular, βC is the effective contact (transmis-
sion) rate, τC is a modification parameter that accounts
for the assumed reduced infectiousness of Ebola-infected
deceased individuals (in comparison to living individu-
als with Ebola symptoms), and φC ≥ 1 is a modification
parameter that accounts for the strength of the traditional
belief systems and customs of the community members
(that aid Ebola transmission). As stated above, the param-
eter φC models, for instance, the belief by some individuals
within the Ebola-stricken nations that there is actually no
such thing as Ebola [23-25], that Ebola is merely govern-
ment propaganda [26] or, simply, the fear of being quar-
antined [27,28] or allowing their loved ones, who have
died of Ebola, to be cremated by public health officials
(burial squad) [27,29]. The overall effect of the traditional
belief systems and customs parameter, φC , in model (1) (or
model (4)), is that it leads to the underreporting of new
EBOV cases. It is worth re-emphasizing that earlier EBOV
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Table 2 Description of the state parameters of themodel
in Figure 1
Parameter Description
βC ,βH Effective contact (transmission) rate in the
community/hospital
C ,RH ,V ,H Recruitment rates
μH Natural death rate
τC , τCi , τHi (i = 1, 2) Modification parameters for infectiousness
φC ,φH Strengths of traditional belief systems and
customs in community and hospital
σC , σH Progression rates of symptomatic individuals in the
community and hospital
αC ,αH Progression rates of early symptomatic individuals
in the community and hospital
g Fraction of symptomatic individuals who are
hospitalized
h Fraction of symptomatic non-hospitalized
individuals who recovered
f Fraction of symptomatic hospitalized individuals
who recovered
ωCN ,ωRH Hospitalization rates of symptomatic individuals
in the community and health-care workers
ωCH Rate of escape from hospitalization
ε Efficacy of hospitalization in preventing the
escape of Ebola-infected patients
εD Efficacy of hospital-sanctioned burial
(burial squad efficacy)
pD Strength of cultural compliance/acceptance of
the burial squad
γC , γH Recovery rates of symptomatic individuals in the
community and hospital
δC , δH Cremation/burial rates of Ebola-deceased
individuals in the community and hospital
ρV , ρRV Transition rates of visitors between the community
and the hospital
ρH , ρRH Transition rates of health-care workers between
the community and hospital
models, such as those in [9,16,18], do not incorporate such
effects.
The associated basic reproduction number [32-35] of
model (1), denoted byR0, is given by
R0 = βCφCσCk1k2k3δC [δC (αC + k3) + τCαCγC(1 − h)] , (2)
where k1 = σC + μH , k2 = αC + μH , k3 = γC + μH and
k4 = σH + μH . The epidemiological quantity, R0, mea-
sures the average number of Ebola cases generated by a
typical Ebola-infected individual (living or dead but not
buried) introduced into a completely susceptible human
population [32-35]. Thus, EBOV can be effectively con-
trolled in the community if the threshold quantity (R0)
can be reduced to (and maintained at) a value less than
unity (i.e.,R0 < 1).
Interpretation ofR0
The basic reproduction number, given by Equation 2, can
be rewritten in the following convenient form:
R0 = βCφCσCk1k2 +
βCφCσCαC
k1k2k3
+ βCφCτCσCαCγC(1 − h)k1k2k3δC .
(3)
The epidemiological quantity, R0, can be interpreted
as follows. The first term in Equation 3 measures the
average number of new cases generated by symptomatic
individuals in the early stage of EBOV infection (ICE). It
is the product of the infection rate of susceptible indi-
viduals in the community by members of the ICE group
(βCφCS∗C/N∗P = βCφC sinceN∗P = S∗C), the probability that
an exposed individual in the community survives the EC
class and moves to the ICE class (σC/k1) and the average
duration in the ICE class (1/k2).
The second term in Equation 3 accounts for the aver-
age number of new EBOV infections generated by non-
hospitalized symptomatic individuals in the community
(ICN ). It is the product of the infection rate of susceptible
individuals by the non-hospitalized symptomatic indi-
viduals (βCφCS∗C/N∗P = βCφC), the probability that an
exposed individual in the community survives the EC class
and transits to the ICE class (σC/k1), the probability that
an individual in the ICE class survives this class and moves
to the ICN class (αC/k2) and the average duration in the
ICN class (1/k3).
Finally, the third term in Equation 3 represents the aver-
age number of new infections generated by Ebola-infected
deceased individuals in the community. It is the product
of the infection rate of susceptible individuals by Ebola-
deceased individuals (βCφCτCS∗C/N∗P = βCφCτC), the
probability that an exposed individual in the community
survives the EC class (σC/k1) and moves to the ICE class,
the probability that an individual in the ICE class survives
this class and transits to the ICN class (αC/k2), the proba-
bility that an individual in the ICN class did not survive at
the end of their time in this class, but died and moved to
the DC class (γC(1 − h)/k3), and the average duration in
the cremated/buried class (1/δC).
The sum of these three terms gives the basic reproduc-
tion number,R0. The disease can be effectively controlled
ifR0 is less than unity, and will persist if it exceeds unity.
The numerical value (or range) of the threshold quan-
tityR0 is estimated using the parameter values and ranges
tabulated in Table 3. While some of the parameter values
in Table 3 were obtained from the literature, others were
estimated or fitted based on the EBOV data for Guinea,
from 22 March to 29 August 2014 [16] (see Figure 2). For
instance, the demographic parameter, μH , is estimated as
μH = 1/58 per year, where 58 years is the average lifes-
pan in Guinea [31]. The other demographic parameter,
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Table 3 Values and ranges of the parameters in model (4)
andmodel (1)
Parameter Baseline value Range Reference
βC ,βH 0.3045 [0.2741 to 0.339]/day Fitted
C 555/day Estimated
using [31]
RH ,V ,H 400/day [10 to 800]/day Variable
μH 0.00004/day [1/[ 80 × 365] to
1/[ 58 × 365]]/day
[53,54]
ψH (1/10)/day [1/1,000 to 1]/day Assumed
τC , τCi , τHi ,
i = 1, 2
0.21/day [0.1 to 0.5]/day [55]
φC 1.2532 [1.1282 to 1.3785] Fitted
φH 1 Fitted
σC , σV , σH 0.5239/day [0.4715 to 0.5763]/day Fitted
αC ,αH 0.5472/day [0.4925 to 0.6019]/day Fitted
f , h 0.42, 0.48/day [0.42 to 0.8]/day [16,18]
g 0.5/day [0.5 to 0.8]/day [18]
ωCH ,ωCN 0.21/day [0.1 to 0.5],
[0.15 to 0.25]/day
Fitted
ωRH 0.5/day [0.5 to 1.0]/day Fitted
ε 0.21/day [0.1 to 0.5]/day Variable
γC , γH 0.5366/day [0.4829 to 0.5903]/day Fitted
δC , δH (1/2)/day [1/2 to 1]/day [18]
ρV , ρRV 0.271/hour [0 to 1/2], 1/7/hour [55]
ρH , ρRH 0.071/hour [1/16 to 1/12],
[1/12 to 1/8]/hour
[55]
C , is then estimated as follows. Since the total popula-
tion of Guinea as at 2013 was 11,745,000 [31], we assumed
that C/μH , which is the limiting total human popula-
tion in the absence of the disease, is 11,745,000, so that
C = 202500 per year. Consequently, using these param-
eter estimates, we show, in this study, that the value of
R0 for the 2014 Ebola outbreak in Guinea is R0 ≈ 1.46.
Although this estimate is slightly lower than that reported
by Althaus [16] (who used the same data to estimateR0 ≈
1.51), it falls within the estimate of R0 ∈ [ 1, 2] given in
[16,19,20,36]. The fluctuations in the cumulative data in
Figure 2may be due to the correction of these numbers (by
the World Health Organization (WHO)), as more reliable
data became available.
Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis [37-39] is carried out, on the param-
eters of model (1), to determine which of the parameters
have the most significant impact on the outcome of the
numerical simulations of the model. Figure 3 depicts the
partial rank correlation coefficient (PRCC) values for each
parameter of the model, using the ranges and baseline
values tabulated in Table 3 (with the basic reproduction
number, R0, as the response function). It follows from
this figure that, in the absence of anti-Ebola public health
interventions, the parameters that have the most influ-
ence on Ebola transmission dynamics in Guinea are the
traditional/cultural/custom belief systems (φC), the pro-
gression rate of early symptomatic individuals in the com-
munity αC , the effective contact rate (βC) and the recovery
rate of symptomatic individuals in the community (γC).
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Figure 2 Data fitting of the reported cumulative new cases and EBOV-induced mortality. The fitting used model (1). The data are for the 2014 EBOV
outbreaks in Guinea (extracted from the World Health Organization website by Althaus [16]). The parameters fitted are given as βC = 0.3045,
σC = 0.5239, αC = 0.5472, γC = 0.5366 and φC = 1.2532. (Approval was given by C. Althaus to use the data cited in [16]).
Agusto et al. BMCMedicine  (2015) 13:96 Page 8 of 17
Figure 3 Partial rank correlation coefficient values for model (1). The
basic reproduction number (R0) was used as the response function.
Thus, this study identifies the most important parame-
ters that drive the transmission mechanism of the disease
in Guinea. The identification of these key parameters is
vital to the formulation of effective control strategies for
combatting the spread of the disease. In other words,
the results of this sensitivity analysis suggest that a strat-
egy that minimizes the impact of the traditional/cultural
beliefs and customs parameter (that is, reduce φC to a
value closer to unity), reduces the progression rate of early
symptomatic individuals (decrease αC), reduces the risk of
acquisition of Ebola infection in the community (reduce
βC) and increases the recovery rate (increase γC) would
be quite effective in curtailing the spread of the disease in
the country. Furthermore, these simulations suggest that
the 2014 EBOV outbreaks can be effectively controlled
using basic (non-pharmaceutical) public health control
measures (such as the aforementioned).
Sensitivity analysis was also carried out using the cumu-
lative number of new cases generated by symptomatic
individuals in the community at time t = 360 days (i.e.,
about a year after the start of the outbreak). In this case,
the dominant parameters that positively impact the cumu-
lative number of new cases are the recruitment rate into
the community (C) and the traditional/cultural/custom
beliefs parameter (φC) (these parameters remain dom-
inant even after 18 months). Furthermore, the analy-
sis was implemented using the cumulative number of
new cases generated by Ebola-infected deceased individ-
uals, showing, for this case, the dominant parameters
to be the modification parameter associated with dis-
ease transmission by Ebola-infected deceased individuals
(τC), the fraction of symptomatic individuals who recov-
ered in the community (h) and the cremation parameter
(δC); here, too, these parameters remain the dominant
ones 18 months after the initial outbreak. Surprisingly,
the parameter associated with the detrimental role of
the traditional/cultural/custom belief systems (φC) and
the recruitment rate (C) have only a marginal effect
under this scenario. Hence, it follows from the above
that the results obtained from the uncertainty/sensitivity
analysis are dependent on the response/output function
chosen (it is, however, generally accepted thatR0 is a very
good determinant or predictor of disease burden during
an epidemic or disease outbreak).
To quantify the expected burden of the disease in the
country (under the worst-case scenario), a box plot of the
distribution of R0 is generated, using the parameter val-
ues and ranges in Table 3 with φC = 1.5. The results
obtained, depicted in Figure 4a, show the distribution of
the reproduction number in the range R0 ∈ [ 1.15, 2.05]
(with a meanR0 ≈ 1.6, suggesting the potential for larger
EBOV outbreaks, in comparison to the case where such
belief systems and customs had no detrimental effects,
where one infected case infects, on average, about 1.6 oth-
ers). However, when the strength of the traditional beliefs
and customs parameter is reduced to φC = 1.0 (i.e., people
do not harbor detrimental traditional belief systems and
customs that aid Ebola transmission), the distribution of
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Figure 4 Box plot ofR0 for model (1). (a) Traditional belief systems and custom parameter, φC = 1.5. (b) Traditional belief systems and custom
parameter, φC = 1. Parameter values (baseline) and ranges used are as given in Table 3.
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R0, depicted in Figure 4b, decreases to R0 ∈ [ 0.77, 1.35],
with a mean ofR0 ≈ 1 (corresponding to a much reduced
disease burden, in comparison to the former scenario with
φC = 1.5). It is evident from the box plots in Figure 4
that the disease burden associated with the case where
the belief systems and customs are taken into account
(Figure 4a) is at least 50% more than that for the case
when these systems and customs do not induce any detri-
mental effect (Figure 4b). Furthermore, it is worth noting
that for φC = 1.5 (Figure 4a), the box plots are all right-
skewed, with the central 50% of the generated R0 values
concentrated in the interval [ 1.36, 1.68], with the median
close to the mean value, R0 = 1.5. Thus, large R0 val-
ues, such as 2.1 and higher, will likely not be observed.
For the case when φC = 1.0 (Figure 4b), the box plots
are also right-skewed, with the central 50% of the gener-
atedR0 values concentrated in the interval [ 0.9, 1.2], with
the median around R0 = 1. Nonetheless, these simula-
tions emphasize the significant role the traditional beliefs
and customs parameter (φC) plays in the 2014 EBOV
outbreaks in Guinea.
In summary, the aforementioned sensitivity analysis of
model (1) suggests that control efforts should be focused
on reducing the strength of the traditional beliefs and cus-
toms parameter (by reducing φC), increasing recovery rate
(by increasing γC) and reducing transmission (via a reduc-
tion in βC). This can be achieved through a variety of
ways, such as a public health education/awareness cam-
paign through media and radio advertisements, as well
as door-to-door education of members of the commu-
nity (to desensitize them against harboring such detri-
mental traditional beliefs and customs). Furthermore,
effective measures for curtailing disease transmission by
infected people in the community (i.e., minimizing βC)
and Ebola-infected deceased individuals (minimizing τC)
must be undertaken. This can be achieved by encouraging
the use of protective equipment by health-care workers,
proper handling of Ebola-infected deceased individu-
als (before burial), etc. [29,40,41]. To increase recovery
among infected people in the community (i.e., increase the
fraction h), Ebola clinics and tents should be set up, and
the populace encouraged to use them. Since EVD causes
high numbers of fatalities, in part due to dehydration of
infected individuals [41] and lack of health-care facili-
ties, measures focused on providing adequate resources
to such clinics or temporary make-shift tents for vis-
its to patient will help increase the survival chances of
Ebola-infected humans. While recruitment (C) into the
community via immigration (movement) cannot be pre-
vented (except in extreme cases [42]), the public health
agencies need to ensure that Ebola test units and clinics
are in place at major points of entry, such as airports and
border crossings, and to discourage intra-city movement
of Ebola-infected individuals [40,43].
Role of infectious living humans and Ebola-deceased
individuals
In this section, the contributions of EBOV-infected
(symptomatic) individuals in the early (ICE) and late (ICN )
stages of infectiousness on EBOV burden in the country
will be quantified (for the case where no interventions are
implemented).
Figure 5a shows that while the Ebola-infected deceased
individuals contribute about 22% of the total number of
new infections, individuals in the early infection stage
contribute about 33% and those in the late infection stage
contribute the bulk of the infections (about 45%). This
figure underlines the significance of the role of poor
handling of Ebola-infected deceased individuals on the
transmission dynamics of the disease in the community.
The effect of the traditional belief systems and customs
parameter (φC) is further assessed by simulating model
(1) using the parameters in Table 3 and various values
of φC . The results obtained, depicted in Figure 6, show,
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Figure 5 Simulations of model (1). (a) Total number of new cases generated by symptomatic living and deceased Ebola-infected individuals.
(b) Cumulative number of new cases generated by symptomatic living and deceased Ebola-infected individuals. Parameter values used are as given
in Table 3.
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Figure 6 Simulations of model (1) with different values of φC = 1.5, 1.3, 1.2, 1.0. (a) Total number of new cases generated by symptomatic living
individuals. (b) Total number of new cases generated by Ebola-infected deceased individuals. Parameter values used are as given in Table 3.
as expected, that the total number of new cases gener-
ated by symptomatic individuals (and associated peak)
increases with increasing values of φC (Figure 6a). Under
this (worst-case) scenario, and with φC = 1.5 [21], the
number of new Ebola cases peaks at about 49,560 after 72
days of the initial outbreak. Similar results were obtained
for the total number of new cases generated by the Ebola-
infected deceased individuals (Figure 6b). These simu-
lations further suggest, as expected, that a larger Ebola
burden would have been recorded if effective anti-Ebola
public health strategies were not implemented (in a timely
manner).
In summary, the simulations of the worst-case scenario
model (1) show that (in the absence of intervention):
• Traditional belief systems and customs play a vital
role in the 2014 Ebola outbreaks in Guinea (this
would have resulted in about a 50% increase in the
disease burden recorded in Guinea, in the absence of
basic public health control measures).
• Ebola-infected deceased individuals contribute about
22% of the total number of new infections, while
individuals in the early and later (symptomatic)
stages contribute about 33% and 45%, respectively.
• The total number of new cases generated by
symptomatic living and Ebola-infected deceased
individuals increases with increasing values of the
traditional beliefs and customs parameter (φC).
• The 2014 EVD is controllable using (affordable) basic
public health control measures that focus on
minimizing the strength of the detrimental
traditional belief systems and customs in the affected
country, increasing the recovery rate and decreasing
disease transmission.
Assessment of basic control measures
The above analyses were implemented for the worst-case
scenario. In practice, however, public health intervention
strategies were implemented in an effort to combat effec-
tively the spread of EBOV in the affected countries (and,
by extension, globally). In this section, the population-
level impact of basic public health intervention strategies,
on the disease dynamics in Guinea, is assessed. A sensi-
tivity analysis is, first of all, carried out on the full model
(4), with the total number of surviving individuals (suscep-
tible and recovered) as the response (outcome) function.
Figure 7a shows the PRCC values for each parameter
used in the sensitivity analysis. From this figure, it follows
(a) (b)
Figure 7 Partial rank correlation coefficient values of model (1). There were two response functions. (a) Total number of surviving individuals.
(b) Total number of symptomatic individuals. Parameter values (baseline) and ranges used are as given in Table 3.
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that for model (4), the dominant parameters are the hos-
pital escape rate of symptomatic individuals (ωCH ), the
parameters for the strength of traditional/cultural/custom
beliefs in the community and in health-care settings (φC
and φH ), the fraction of symptomatic individuals who
recovered in the community (h), the efficacy of hospi-
talization (ε) and the hospitalization rate of the non-
hospitalized symptomatic individuals (ωCN ). A similar
analysis was carried out using the total number of symp-
tomatic individuals as the response function, and the
dominant parameters in this case (see Figure 7b) are the
traditional/cultural/custom beliefs modification parame-
ters for the community and the health-care workers (φH
and φC), the visitors’ mobility rates from the hospital back
to the community (ρRV ) and the progression rate of symp-
tomatic individuals in the community and hospital (σC
and σV ). When the number of Ebola-infected deceased
individuals is used as the response function, the dominant
parameters are φH , φC , ρRV , σC and σV (Figure 8a).
Finally, when the number of Ebola-infected cre-
mated/buried individuals is chosen as the response func-
tion, the key parameters (Figure 8b) are the escape rate
from hospitalization of symptomatic individuals (ωCH ),
the fraction of symptomatic individuals who recovered
in hospital (f ), the fraction of symptomatic individu-
als who recovered in the community (h) and the tra-
ditional/cultural/custom beliefs modification parameters
of the community and the health-care workers (φC and
φH ). Again, these results further emphasize the sensitiv-
ity of the simulation (sensitivity analysis) results on the
response function chosen. These results show that a basic
public health strategy that, in addition to the three aspects
identified under the worst-case scenario (i.e., decrease
φC to a value less than unity, increase recovery rate (γC)
and decrease transmission rate (βC)), also ensures that
hospitalized people do not harbor detrimental traditional
beliefs (decrease φH to a value close to, or equal to, unity),
will minimize the hospital escape rate (decrease ωCH
and ε), reduce the number and duration of visits in
hospitals etc., which will be very effective in curtailing the
spread of EBOV.
Effectiveness levels of basic intervention strategy
The primary aim of this study is to assess the role of basic
(non-pharmaceutical) public health control measures for
effective containment of the 2014 EBOV outbreaks. As
noted by the WHO on the situation in Liberia, ‘the con-
ventional control interventions are not having adequate
impact (in curtailing the spread of EVD) in the country,
although they are effective in countries such as Nigeria,
Senegal, and the Democratic Republic of Congo with
limited transmission’ [44]. Following the results of the
sensitivity analysis in section ‘Assessment of basic con-
trol measures’ above, the following effectiveness levels of
the basic public health control strategy against Ebola are
formulated.
Low-effectiveness level of the basic public health control
strategy
The low-effectiveness level of the anti-Ebola control strat-
egy assumes the strength of the community’s traditional/
cultural/custom belief systems to be 1.5 (i.e., φC = 1.5).
Recall that the beliefs parameter, φC , captures, inter alia,
the community sentiments and reactions towards the dis-
ease, the presence of shadow zones [28] and underreport-
ing [21,30]. It is assumed that hospitalized Ebola-infected
individuals do not hold such traditional/cultural beliefs
(so that φH = 1). Furthermore, due to the relative high
value of the beliefs parameter (φC), it is plausible to
assume, under this low-effectiveness level of the control
strategy, that some symptomatic individuals may choose
to escape from the isolation units after a day of hospital-
ization (i.e., 1/ωCH = 1). Additionally, due to the social
nature of and strong family ties in the affected communi-
ties, it is assumed, for this effectiveness level, that com-
munity members visiting their infected loved ones and/or
acquaintances in health-care facilities stay at the facilities
for an average period of 10 hours (i.e., 1/ρV = 1/ρRV =
(a) (b)
Figure 8 Partial rank correlation coefficient values of model (1). There were two response functions. (a) Total number of Ebola-infected deceased
individuals. (b) Total number of Ebola-infected cremated/buried individuals. Parameter values (baseline) and ranges used are as given in Table 3.
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10 hours). Health-care workers and returning health-care
workers work daily 8-hour shifts (i.e., 1/ρH = 1/ρRH =
8 hours). For this effectiveness level, it is assumed that
no transmission-reduction measures are implemented by
the health-care workers or visitors in hospitals, and it is
further assumed that Ebola-infected deceased individuals
transmit at the same rate as living symptomatic individu-
als (i.e., no extra care in handling Ebola-infected corpses).
These assumptions lead to setting 1/ψH = 1/τC1 =
1/τC2 = 1/τH1 = 1.
Moderate-effectiveness level of the basic public health
control strategy
For themoderate-effectiveness level of the anti-Ebola con-
trol strategy, the community’s traditional/cultural/custom
beliefs parameter is reduced to 1.2 (i.e., φC = 1.2). Here,
the hospital (or health-care facility) escape rate of symp-
tomatic individuals is increased to 3 days (i.e., 1/ωCH = 3
days). Visiting periods were reduced to 3 hours daily (i.e.,
1/ρV = 1/ρRV = 3 hours), and health-care workers and
returning health-care workers work daily 16-hour shifts
(i.e., 1/ρH = 1/ρRH = 16 hours). For this effectiveness
level, the modification parameters for the infectiousness
of symptomatic individuals are reduced: 1/ψH = 10 and
1/τC1 = 1/τC2 = 1/τH1 = 100. Lastly, the crema-
tion/burial rates of Ebola-infected deceased individuals
(δC and δH ) are increased by 50% (i.e., δC = δH =
0.5 × 1.5).
High-effectiveness level of the basic public health control
strategy
For the high-effectiveness level of the anti-Ebola con-
trol strategy, the community’s traditional/cultural/custom
beliefs parameter is reduced to unity (i.e., these beliefs
have no detrimental effect on Ebola transmission dynam-
ics). The escape rate of symptomatic individuals from
isolation units is set to 20 days (i.e., 1/ωCH = 20 days).
The visiting period is reduced to 1 hour daily (i.e., 1/ρV =
1/ρRV = 1 hour), and health-care workers and returning
health-care workers work 24-hour shifts (i.e., ρH = ρRH =
1 day). (It should be stated that requiring health-care
workers to work 24-hour shifts may not always be realis-
tic, but the scarcity of such workers in some health-care
settings may necessitate this.) Furthermore, the modifi-
cation parameters for the infectiousness of symptomatic
individuals are reduced to 1/ψH = 100 and 1/τC1 =
1/τC2 = τH1 = 1000. The cremation/burial rates (δC
and δH ) are increased by 90% (so that δC = δH =
0.5 × 1.9).
Figure 9a depicts the cumulative number of symp-
tomatic cases generated under the low-effectiveness level
of the control strategy over a 200-day period, from
which it follows that nearly 380,000 cases would have
been recorded. Figure 9b shows a dramatic reduc-
tion (to 92 and 50, respectively) under the moderate-
and high-effectiveness levels of the control strategy. It
is worth noting that although, as expected, the high-
effectiveness of the control strategy is far more effective
in curtailing Ebola burden in the affected communi-
ties, the moderate-effectiveness level of the strategy also
resulted in a dramatic decline in the number of cases
in comparison to the low-effectiveness level. Similarly,
the high-effectiveness level of this strategy is far more
effective in reducing the cumulative Ebola-infected mor-
tality (Figures 10). These simulations clearly show that the
2014 Ebola outbreaks are controllable using basic pub-
lic health control measures, such as the moderate- and
high-effectiveness levels of the control strategy described
above. In particular, a 90% reduction in Ebola burden
can be achieved by implementing basic control measures,
such as:
• increasing the duration of health-care workers’ shifts
to 24 hours;
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Figure 9 Simulations of model (4). The cumulative number of symptomatic cases generated under various effectiveness levels of the basic public
health control strategy is shown. (a) Low-effectiveness level. (b)Moderate- and high-effectiveness levels. Other parameter values used are as given
in Table 3.
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Figure 10 Simulations of model (4). The cumulative Ebola mortality for various effectiveness levels of the basic public health control strategy is
shown. (a) Low-effectiveness level. (b)Moderate- and high-effectiveness levels. Parameter values used are as given in Table 3.
• reducing the duration of visits (of family members
and acquaintances) to Ebola isolation units and wards
in hospitals/clinics/tents to 1 hour;
• reducing the strength of the community’s
detrimental traditional/cultural/custom beliefs, fear,
mistrust and anger against public health authorities.
It is worth stating that the above simulation results
support the success story of Ebola control in Nigeria,
a country of over 170 million people and with a more
developed public health infrastructure (and largely edu-
cated citizenry who are less amenable to harbor such
detrimental traditional/cultural belief systems and cus-
toms). Nigeria’s first case of Ebola was identified on 20
July 2014 (when a visitor flew into Lagos from Monrovia,
Liberia, in search of anti-Ebola medical care) [2,4,45,46].
This resulted in 19 other cases and 8 deaths in total [47].
Nigeria was able to contain the spread of the virus [17,45-
48] due, largely, to effective contract tracing of suspected
cases, monitoring of traced cases and isolating those with
EBOV symptoms. Moreover, the people in the affected
area (Lagos State, Nigeria) adhered, strictly, to the anti-
Ebola pronouncements and guidelines stipulated by the
public health officials (at such a dire time of immense fear)
[45]. The WHO declared Nigeria to be Ebola-free on 20
October 2014 [49].
Results summary and discussion
A new compartmental mathematical model, which strat-
ifies the total population into those in the community
and those in health-care facilities, is designed and used
to study the 2014 Ebola outbreaks in Guinea. The model
incorporates notable crucial features associated with dis-
ease transmission, such as the interaction between mem-
bers of the community and their health-care settings, the
role of Ebola-deceased individuals, and traditional belief
systems and customs. It is used to assess the population-
level impact of basic (non-pharmaceutical) public health
control measures (such as proper handling of Ebola-
infected patients and Ebola-deceased patients, limiting
the duration of family visits to health-care facilities to see
infected loved ones etc.).
The study shows that, in the absence of public health
interventions, the 2014 EBOV outbreaks would have had
a much higher public health burden in Guinea (and, by
extension, the other affected countries). The distribution
of the basic reproduction number (R0), an epidemio-
logical threshold quantity that measures the spreading
capacity of the disease, is estimated to lie in the range
[ 0.77, 1.35] when detrimental traditional belief systems
and customs are not at play, and within the range
[ 1.15, 2.05] if such belief systems and customs are taken
into account. Traditional beliefs and customs played a
crucial role in fueling the 2014 EBOV outbreaks, since
people in the Ebola-stricken communities generally did
not adhere to the guidelines of the public health offi-
cials. This was because of their mistrust of the authori-
ties, thinking that Ebola was government propaganda or
thinking that healthy people who go into quarantine may
become deliberately infected while in quarantine. Also,
some isolated infected individuals choose to escape iso-
lation because of a fear of being cremated if they die,
rather than receiving a proper family burial. Further-
more, it is shown that the incorrect handling of Ebola-
deceased individuals contributed to the spread of the
disease (estimated to be about 22%; the rest of the infec-
tions were generated by symptomatic individuals in the
early stage of infection and those who chose not to go to
hospital).
This study identifies the main parameters that drove
the 2014 EBOV outbreaks during the early (pre-
intervention) phase of the disease, namely the tradi-
tional/cultural/custom beliefs factor, the transmission rate
(effective contact rate) of the disease and the recovery
rate of individuals in the community. The identifica-
tion of these crucial parameters helps in formulating
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an effective control strategy. For instance, a strategy
that minimizes the strength of the detrimental tradi-
tional beliefs and customs parameter, as well as reduc-
ing the transmission rate and increasing the recovery
rate would lead to effective community-wide control of
the disease. The strength of the detrimental traditional/
cultural/custom belief systems can be reduced via an
effective community-wide public health education cam-
paign that involves the local chiefs and community lead-
ers. Transmission can be reduced by taking basic public
health measures when caring for Ebola-infected individ-
uals, such as using well-trained health-care professionals
and avoiding contact with infected bodily fluids. Trans-
mission can also be reduced by proper handling of Ebola-
deceased individuals.
This study shows that the 2014 EBOV outbreaks are
controllable using basic (and affordable) public health
control measures. In particular, it is shown that a strat-
egy that increases the length of shifts worked by health-
care workers caring for Ebola-infected patients to 24
hours, limits the duration of visits of family members and
acquaintances to Ebola isolation units and wards to 1 hour
and effectively minimizes the strength of the detrimental
traditional beliefs and customs (that aid Ebola transmis-
sion) could lead to a dramatic reduction (over 90%) of the
Ebola burden in the affected communities. We note that
while the feasibility of working a 24-hour shift is a tough
one to operationalize, it is not unheard of in the health-
care profession [50]. Moreover, in situations where there
are extreme shortages of health-care professionals during
a serious crisis, as in the three countries most affected by
the 2014 EVD epidemic, it would not be unusual to see
health-care workers working such uncommon shifts [51].
However, it is important to note that requiring a health-
care worker to work a 24-hour shift is physically, mentally
and emotionally stressful and may result in errors and
mistakes in their health-care delivery to patients [51]. In
urgent situations and crises were this might occur, plans
should be made to ensure that health-care workers who
work these shifts only do so for a few days consecutively,
and that the nurses and health workers working these
shifts organize their schedules and/or patient visits so that
they, and their colleagues, get time to rest during the
24-hour period (and further adequate rest at the end of
their shift). In other words, this study shows that the 2014
Ebola outbreaks is controllable using basic public health
interventions (provided they are of at least a moderate-
effectiveness level, and are implemented effectively and
consistently).
Recommendations
We conclude by providing the following list of general
recommendations, mostly directly borne out of the sim-
ulation results derived from this study, can help in the
concerted effort to control effectively the ongoing EBOV
outbreaks in West Africa (particularly noting that a cure
and an effective and safe vaccine against Ebola transmis-
sion in humans remain elusive).
• Public health education and campaign: An effective
community-wide public health education campaign,
which includes the local leaders (chiefs), has to be
embarked upon in an effort to minimize the public
mistrust, anger and apprehension against public
health authorities and officials who are fighting to
end the transmission of EVD. Furthermore,
health-care workers must be trained in global best
practices, vis-à-vis the proper way to manage, handle
and care for Ebola-infected individuals and
Ebola-deceased patients (to minimize infection
among health-care professionals). This is in line with
the finding in this study that detrimental traditional
belief systems and customs play a crucial role in the
2014 EBOV outbreaks.
• Creation of Ebola response teams in local
communities: Each local community should have an
Ebola response team (the grassroots movement team)
to help educate the populace about the disease and to
identify potential new cases and report them to public
health agencies immediately. These local teams must
be well trained. Confidence-building measures, to
help them build the trust necessary within the
communities they serve, must be embarked upon.
With a generally weakened health-care system in
each of the three Ebola-stricken regions [2], the time
it takes to isolate early symptomatic cases may be
longer. To limit such a period, and hence minimize
underreporting, such a response team can be the ears
within the local communities. However, a prompt
response from the health-care officials responsible for
transporting these potential new cases is necessary for
the response team to achieve a meaningful impact. In
addition, the response team should serve as a support
system to the local members. Such a team should also
help convince family members of the need to release
their Ebola-deceased relatives to the trained burial
teams and help them mourn properly for their loved
ones. They can also help minimize factors relating to
traditional/cultural beliefs and customs through
some of the aforementioned efforts. This will also
play an important role in minimizing the detrimental
effect of traditional belief systems and customs.
• Preparedness within households: Ebola is one of
those rare diseases that forbids the natural love and
care, through touch, normally provided to sick loved
ones in many cultures. It is difficult for some to see
their vulnerable loved ones sick and yet be unable to
help. That is generally a hard concept. To avoid such
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circumstances, each household should have a
prepared outline of actions to take if symptoms of
EVD become evident within the household. First,
health-care officials should be notified. If no one from
the health-care system comes to transport the
symptomatic individual to a hospital, then while the
family members are still able, they should be advised
to go to a hospital immediately, avoiding crowds. In
the case of children who may not be identified early,
one responsible adult, or a parent, should be given a
protective suit to transport the child. In the case of
late symptomatic individuals, only one designated
member in the household should provide support to
the sick human, even though the first step should be
getting all patients to the hospital or some
health-care facility. This will help early detection and
hospitalization of cases.
• Social strategy: An unspoken feature that may impact
transmission is the social structure associated with
the current Ebola outbreak. Families have lost income,
schools and businesses have been disrupted and most
foreign-owned companies have temporarily closed
down, and so the day-to-day functioning and needs
of community members have been disrupted. To help
cater for the day-to-day needs of communities
quarantined, or the potential loss of income from
reduced business and cultural activities, aid should be
provided to these communities (this would help
minimize the strength of the mistrust and fear against
public authorities, thereby minimizing EVD cases).
• Global strategy: In each of the three Ebola-stricken
countries, health-care workers were overwhelmed
[52]. Health-care facilities, which were weak in the
first place, are now even more weakened [2]. Thus
support, in the form of health-care professionals,
from the rest of the world would help to reinforce an
overwhelmed health-care system and thus help in the
fight against EVD. Given the effects long work hours
could have on the efficiency of health-care workers,
such global support would help to increase the time
period between daily work shifts of health-care
workers who are in direct contact with ebola infected
patients, there by reducing their chances of becoming
infected, which was shown, in this study, to be an
effective control tool against EVD.
Furthermore, support in the form of engineers and
construction volunteers is also essential. With a
weakened health-care system in the three Ebola-
stricken countries [2], the time it takes to isolate early
symptomatic cases and move them to a health-care
setting may take longer due to a lack of trained
professionals to transport the symptomatic humans,
or because of a lack of beds at health-care facilities
(some of the early symptomatic cases that went to
Ebola clinics for consultation were turned down
because of a lack of beds [2]). Thus, more health-care
tents and units are needed for the isolation and care
of symptomatic patients, and support in the form of
engineers and construction volunteers would assist in
setting up such temporary and permanent health
facilities and tents. This would provide space for more
symptomatic individuals, reducing their numbers in
community settings. Moreover, health-care
professionals would be needed to staff these tents.
Appendix
Appendix: Formulation of the general Ebola
transmissionmodel
We use a compartmental framework to model the trans-
mission dynamics of EVD in a population stratified into
two epidemiological settings: those in the community and
those within the health-care system. The population of
susceptible members of the general public (SC) is gener-
ated at the rate c (recruitment or birth). It is further
increased by the return of susceptible visitors from the
hospital (at a rate ρRV ). The population is decreased by
infection (at a rate λC), natural death (at a rate μH ; this
rate is assumed for all epidemiological compartments) and
visits to Ebola-infected relatives in health facilities, such
as hospitals, clinics, make-shift tent clinics, etc. (at a rate
ρV ). The population of exposed (latent infected) members
of the community (EC) is generated at the rate λC and
decreased by development of clinical symptoms of Ebola
(at a rate σC), natural death (at the rate μH ) and visits to
infected relatives in health facilities (at the rate ρV ). It is
increased by the return of the visitors (at a rate ρRV ).
The population of early infectious individuals (ICE) is
generated at the rate σC and decreased by progression
to the non-hospitalized symptomatic class (at a rate
(1 − g)αC , where g is the fraction of these individuals
who are hospitalized), hospitalization (at a rate gαC),
natural death and visits (at the rate ρV ). It is increased
by the return of the visitors (at the rate ρRV ). The pop-
ulation of non-hospitalized symptomatic individuals
(ICN ) is generated at the rate (1 − g)αC . It is further
increased when hospitalized members of the commu-
nity escape from hospital (at a rate (1 − ε)ωCN ; where
0 < ε ≤ 1 is the efficacy of hospitalization to prevent
the escape of Ebola-infected patients). This population
is decreased by recovery (at a rate γC), hospitalization
(at a rate ωCN ) and natural death. The population of
recovered members of the community (RC) is generated
at a rate hγC , where h is the fraction of non-hospitalized
symptomatic individuals who recovered (at the rate γC ;
and the remaining fraction, 1 − h, is deceased). It is
reduced by natural death. The population of members
of the community who died of Ebola (DC) is generated
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at the rate (1 − h)γC and is decreased by cremation (at a
rate δC).
The equations for the dynamics of health-care workers
(those in hospitals, or health-care facilities in general, and
health-care workers who return to the community at the
end of their shift) are similarly derived (and not repeated
here).
S˙C(t) = C − λC(ICE , ICN , IRH ,DC)SC(t) − μHSC(t)
−ρVSC + ρRV SV ,
E˙C(t) = λC(ICE , ICN , IRH ,DC)SC(t) − (σC + μH)EC(t)
−ρVEC(t) + ρRVEV (t),
I˙CE(t) = σCEC(t) − (αC + μH)ICE(t) − ρV ICE(t)
+ρRV ICEV (t), (4)
I˙CN (t) = (1 − g)αCICE(t) + (1 − ε)ωCHICH(t)
−(γC + ωCN + μH)ICN (t),
R˙C(t) = hγCICN (t) − μHRC(t),
D˙C(t) = (1 − h)γCICN (t) − δCDC(t),
S˙RH(t) = RH−λH(ICE , ICN , IRH ,DC)SRH(t)−μHSRH(t)
−ρRHSRH(t) + ρHSH(t),
E˙RH(t) = λH(ICE , ICN , IRH ,DC)SRH(t)−(σH+μH)ERH(t)
−ρRHERH(t) + ρHEH(t),
I˙RH(t) = σHERH(t) − (γH + μH)IRH(t) − ωRHIRH(t),
R˙RH(t) = γHIRH(t) − μHRRH − ρRHRRH(t) + ρHRH(t),
I˙CH(t) = gαCICE(t) + ωCNICN (t)−[ (1 − ε)ωCN + γH
+μH ] ICH(t),
R˙CH(t) = f γHICH(t) − μHRCH(t),
S˙V (t) = V − λH(ICEV , ICH , IH ,DH)SV (t) − μHSV (t)
−ρRVSV (t) + ρVSC(t),
E˙V (t) = λH(ICEV , ICH , IH ,DH)SV (t) − (σV + μH)EV (t)
−ρRVEV (t) + ρVEC(t),
I˙CEV (t) = σVEV (t)−μHICEV (t)−ρRV ICEV (t)+ρV ICE(t),
S˙H(t) = H − λH(ICEV , ICH , IH ,DH)SH(t) − μHSH(t)
−ρHSH(t) + ρRHSRH(t),
E˙H(t) = λH(ICE , ICH , IH ,DH)SH(t) − (σH + μH)EH(t)
−ρHEH(t) + ρRHERH(t),
I˙H(t) = σHEH(t) + ωRHIRH(t) − (γH + μH)IH(t),
R˙H(t) = f γHIH(t) − μHRH(t) + ρRHRRH(t)−ρHRH(t),
D˙H(t) = (1 − f )γHICH(t) + (1 − f )γHIH(t) − δHDH(t),
C˙D(t) = δCDC(t) + δHDH(t),
where,
λC(ICE , ICN , IRH ,DC) = φCβC(ICE + ICN + τC1IRH + τC2DC)NP ,
λH(ICEV , ICH , IH ,DH) = ψHφHβH(ICEV + ICH + IH + τH1DH)NP ,
withNP = SC +EC + ICE + ICN +RC +DC +SRH +ERH +
IRH + RRH + ICH + RCH +SV + EV + ICEV + SH + EH +
IH + +RH + DH + CD.
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